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APPLYING STONE V. POWELL: FULL AND FAIR
LITIGATION OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT HABEAS
CORPUS CLAIM
The proper scope of federal habeas corpus' relief has long been a matter
of concern for the Supreme Court.2 Although at common law the habeas
corpus court only had jurisdiction to ensure that persons in custody were
properly charged and brought to trial within a specific time,3 the scope of
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings is no longer limited to the question
of jurisdiction. Rather, the writ has become a means by which a federal
4
court exercises post-conviction review over the judgment of another court
by effectively supervising the protection of federal constitutional rights in
addition to the proper exercise of jurisdiction.' Federal statutes6 provide
that habeas corpus relief is available to those persons "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . of the United States."'7 Because the
use of the writ has been extended beyond its historic functions at common
law," the Supreme Court recently considered a limitation on the availability of habeas corpus relief in Stone v. Powell' and restricted habeas corpus
with respect to fourth amendment claims.
Federal court application of the writ of habeas corpus to review the
judgment of a state court after the conviction and sentencing of an individI The phrase "habeas corpus" commonly refers to the "Great Writ," habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, which existed at common law in both England and the United States. Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976). Historically, the writ was used to challenge the
legality of confinement and to obtain the presence of an imprisoned party before the court.
See P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1426-27 (2d ed. 1973); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court - Habeas Corpus, 64
MICH. L. REv. 451, 459-61 (1966).
2 See generally Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV.
1038, 1042-43 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus].
Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States - 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244-45 (1965);
see Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts - ConstitutionalRight of Legislative Grace?, 40
CALIF. L. REV. 335, 341-61 (1952). Early cases limited the use of the writ to testing the
jurisdiction of the trial court so that granting habeas corpus relief was proper only when the
trial court lacked jurisdiction. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 22 (1876); Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
See, e.g., Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L. J. 50 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Pollack];
Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: PostconvictionRemedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REv.
461 (1960); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956).
5 A prisoner was entitled to habeas corpus relief not merely when the trial court lacked
jurisdiction, but whenever it had no constitutional authority or power to condemn the prisoner. Hans Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, 184 (1889).
6 Federal courts may inquire into the legality of the confinement of a state prisoner, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970), or a federal prisoner. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); see United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) ( § 2255 remedy equivalent to the common law writ).
7 28U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970); see, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Peyton
v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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ual originated in Brown v. Allen. oIn Brown, the Court expanded the scope
of federal habeas corpus relief by holding that all federal constitutional
rights which had been extended to the states" were cognizable in a federal
habeas corpus action.'" Although in previous habeas corpus proceedings
the merits of constitutional claims had been considered,'" a review of the
merits was limited to determining the adequacy of the state court procedures." The Brown decision, however, permitted federal courts to reconsider a constitutional claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding even if the
state court system had already given fair consideration to the issues.' 5
,0 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1056.
" See note 22 infra.
12 344 U.S. at 463-64. The Court had previously expanded the scope of federal habeas
relief. E.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (constitutionality of statute creating crime
questioned; habeas corpus appropriate to inquire into the legality of imprisonment under
such statute); Ex parteLange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (judge lacked authority to impose
sentence; therefore, the court had no jurisdiction and habeas corpus was the proper remedy).
The appropriateness of using the trial court's lack of jurisdiction as the sole basis for
granting habeas corpus relief was questioned in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), and
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). In both cases, a state petitioner claimed denial of his
due process rights as a result of conviction in an allegedly mob-dominated trial. Although in
Frank the Court found that the trial court had jurisdiction and did not order consideration
of the claim on the merits, 237 U.S. at 326-29, the'Mo6re Court allowed the federal habeas
corpus judge to reach the merits of petitioner's allegation. 261 U.S. at 91. While one commentator has viewed Moore as overruling Frank, Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315, 1329 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Reitz],
the two cases have been reconciled on the grounds that both decisions support the proposition
that redetermination of a claim on federal habeas corpus review is necessary when the state
judicial process has been so inadequate that the federal court cannot be confident that the
state has fulfilled its obligation to apply federal law. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HIv. L. Rxv. 441, 489 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Bator]. Therefore, confusion as to the proper interpretation of the Moore and Frank
opinions obscured the necessity of defining the issues properly cognizable on habeas corpus,
Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1052, and the Court woisened the situation by continuing
to base its decisions on the jurisdiction rationale. For example, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 465-68 (1938), the Court granted habeas corpus relief holding that a federal trial court
did not have jurisdiction over a defendant who was denied assistance of counsel. Alternatively, the Court might have identified the right to counsel as a claim properly cognizable in
a habeas corpus proceeding. Because of such confusion in the Court's analysis, the limits of
habeas corpus were poorly defined. See generally Bator, supra.
," See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 394 U.S. 458 (1938); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); see note 12 supra.
" Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1056-57. Inadequacy of state court procedure might
be shown in a case where appellate review had been provided, but the inability of the appeals
court to look beyond the record had prejudiced the disposition of the claim. Id. at 1059.
15 344 U.S. at 463-64. In Brown, the defendant claimed that he was denied due process
because coerced confessions were introduced against him at trial and because the grand and
petit juries were selected from taxpayer listings which were predominantly composed of white
citizens. Id. at 466. Although these contentions were considered by the state supreme court,
the state adjudication was not considered binding on the federal court. Even if the state
process was procedurally fair, the state court conclusions were held not to be binding if there
was any possibility that a federal constitutional right had not received adequate consideration. Id. at 508. The same rationale asserted by the Brown Court has been advanced to justify
providing a federal forum for state prisoners. Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1060-61. Since
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Reconsideration of the constitutional claim was not limited to issues of
law. The federal judge had discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing to
repeat the fact-finding process. 6 Furthermore, Brown indicated that this
repetition was mandatory in "unusual circumstances"' 7 or when the state
fact-finding process was tainted by a "vital flaw."'" By unequivocally establishing a broad role for habeas corpus jurisdiction under which federal
courts were free to inspect both the legal conclusions and the fact-finding
process of the state courts, the Brown Court created possible tension between state and federal courts. 9 After Brown, the decisions of state court
judges deciding federal questions properly raised in state litigation could2
be reversed by federal district court judges on habeas corpus review. 1
Where the state court had fully litigated the issues, conflicts with the
principles of finality2 ' were created. In addition, Brown's extension of ha-

beas corpus relief to encompass all constitutional claims 22 created the possibility of severe strain on the judicial system by expanding the opportunity for state prisoners to file frivolous claims.Y
state judges might be inclined to concentrate on state substantive goals in reaching their
decisions, providing a federal forum protects individual rights while creating a greater likelihood of uniform ipplication of federal constitutional law to all state prisoners. Id.
344 U.S. at 478, 503-06.
'7

Id. at 463.

Id. at 506. No attempt, was made, however, to illustrate the situations in which "vital
flaws" or "unusual circumstances" might be found. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
1"The concept of federalism includes the conflict created when state and federal courts
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions. Bator, supra note 12, at 454. Since
federal review of a state court judgment on such issues casts doubt upon the integrity of the
state system, federal courts are generally unwilling to invalidate a state conviction. Habeas
Corpus, supra note 2, at 1095. Therefore, before Brown, the tensions arising out of federalism
conflicts led the federal courts to relitigate facts in habeas corpus proceedings only where the
state court adjudication had failed to protect federal constitutional rights. Id. at 1040-41.
20 Federal-state comity requires federal court deference to the state court's determination
until the higher state courts have an opportunity to consider the matter in controversy. C.
"

WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL

COURTS § 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WmRHT]. Because Brown

made review of the facts found by the state trial court discretionary, see note 16 supra, the
Brown decision conflicted with the rule of comity. See WRIGHT, supra. For the purposes of
habeas corpus proceedings, the rule of comity has now been embodied in the exhaustion
requirement, Wright, supraat § 53, and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1970). See note
38 infra.
2, The concept of finality is rooted in the idea that a satisfactory end to the litigation
must eventually be achieved. Bator, supra note 12, at 442. Finality is promoted for a number
of reasons including conservation of judicial resources, maintenance of the trial judge's sense
of responsibility and enhancement of the effectiveness of the criminal procedural system by
assuring that one violating the law will receive swift punishment. Bator, supra note 12, at
445-52. Consistent with finality principles, the federal habeas corpus statutes provide that a
district judge is not required to entertain successive petitions once the legality of a prisoner's
detention is determined on a writ of habeas corpus unless the prisoner alleges new grounds
for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1970).
11At the time of the Brown decision, many constitutional safeguards had not been
imposed upon the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment extended to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(fourth amendment extended to states).
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The expansionary trend begun by Brown and the problems accompanying the changing scope of the writ were augmented by the Court's decision
in Townsend v. Sain.4 In Townsend, the Court specified the circumstances
25
necessitating fact-finding hearings in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
A federal evidentiary hearing under Townsend is required whenever the
habeas corpus petitioner does not receive a full and fair fact-finding hearing in the state court system. 2 By making a federal evidentiary hearing
mandatory in certain situations where the state court had not "reliably"
found the relevant facts," the Townsend Court broadened the scope of
factual inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings.2 Since the completeness of
the state inquiry was critical to the question of whether a new hearing was
mandatory, the Townsend decision sanctioned further federal supervision
of the state courts.2 9 Finally, by allowing new evidentiary hearings in an
expanded number of situations, the Townsend standard 3° strained the allocation of judicial resources by requiring cumbersome evidentiary hear31
ings.
2 Frivolous petitions were filed in increasing numbers in an attempt to abuse the remedy
afforded by the Great Writ even before Brown. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) (in a five-year period, five prisoners filed 50,
27, 24, 22, and 20 petitions respectively); Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 315 n.8 (1948) (from 1937-47, six prisoners in Alcatraz penitentiary filed
a total of 68 petitions). For an argument that the sheer number of cases may overstate the
burden on the federal judiciary, see Wulf, Limiting PrisonerAccess to Habeas Corpus Assault on the Great Writ, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 253 (1973). See also Shapiro, FederalHabeas
Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REv. 321 (1973).
24 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See generally Wright, Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners:
The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L. J. 895 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Fact-FindingResponsibility].
2 A federal evidentiary hearing under Townsend is required when: 1) the merits of the
factual dispute are not resolved in the state hearing; 2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record; 3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court is
inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
didcovered evidence; 5) the material facts are not fully developed at the state court hearing;
or 6) the state trier of fact does not afford the habeas petitioner a full and fair hearing on a
constitutional claim for any reason. 372 U.S. at 313.
26 372 U.S. at 312-13; see note 25 supra.
372 U.S. at 312-13.
28 In Brown, a new fact-finding proceeding was mandatory only when the state process
had been infected with a "vital flaw," 344 U.S. at 506. The Townsend Court responded to
Brown's failure to define a "vital flaw" by articulating a standard which expanded the
number of situations in which,federal fact-finding hearings are mandatory. See Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1121-22.
2, In order to determine whether the Townsend criteria had been satisfied, see note 25
supra, the federal habeas court had to undertake a thorough examination of the state records
and procedures. See Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1122-23.
11The Townsend standard has been codified in the federal habeas corpus statute. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b), (c) (1970).
31 Townsend strains judicial resources by requiring a federal fact-finding hearing even
though there is no claim of inadequacy as to facts already found in the state hearing. For
instance, if a federal hearing is required by Townsend because the prisoner alleges substantial
newly discovered evidence, there will be no reason to distrust the findings made at the state
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The possibilities for further expansion of the situations requiring new
fact-finding hearings in federal habeas corpus proceedings were recognized
in Fay v. Noia. In Fay, the Court held that an adequate and independent
state ground for decision would no longer preclude review of a constitutional claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 4 Therefore, according
to Fay, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is conferred whenever the petitioner alleges a deprivation of his constitutional rights which was not corrected in the state court proceedings.1 Adding tothe trend allowing federal
court consideration of state prisoners' constitutional claims, 36 Fay held
that a procedural default would preclude a petitioner from raising his
claim on habeas corpus only in those cases where the petitioner had bypassed state procedures deliberately.Y Moreover, federal courts may exfact-finding hearing. While these findings should be given weight in the federal hearing,
Habeas Corpus, note 2 supra, at 1131, there is nothing in Townsend to suggest that such
consideration is mandatory. Thus, in this situation, a new Townsend hearing could result in
wasteful and unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.
32 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
1 The adequate and independent state ground doctrine was originally developed as a
means of preventing federal courts from reviewing state decisions which rested on independent and dispositive state substantive grounds. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590,
635-36 (1875) (federal question decided against appellant; the Court could not review decision
on title dispute settled under state law). The doctrine was later extended to preclude review
of decisions resting on state procedural grounds. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117
(1945) (failure to follow proper state transfer procedures to maintain jurisdiction could constitute independent and adequate state ground). Under the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine, federal courts can only review the correctness of decisions of a state's highest
courts where federal issues are involved and the state issue is not dispositive. Murdock v.
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875). See generally Reitz, supranote 12, at 134052.
372 U.S. at 438. The Court distinguished Murdock, see note 33 supra, by noting that
it involved the propriety of federal courts deciding questions of state substantive law. Id. at
431. In Fay, however, the only substantive question was found to be federal. Id. Therefore, a
practical appraisal of the state interest involved in Fay could not justify the federal courts'
enforcement of the adequate state ground rule in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at
433.
' Id. at 426-27.
36 The full effect of the broadened scope of federal habeas corpus relief after Fay and
Townsend became evident as the numbers of petitions filed by state prisoners increased.
From 1963 to 1964, habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal district courts
rose from 1,903 to 3,531, an increase of 85.5%. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (1964). This increase could also be partially
attributable to the Court's due process decisions. By applying federal constitutional rights
to the states, the Court granted state prisoners new grounds for seeking habeas corpus relief.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (due process requires that indigent state
defendants be afforded appointed counsel at trial).
31372 U.S. at 438. The Fay Court distinguished between waiver and deliberate bypass
for the purpose of determining when federal habeas corpus relief should be granted. Id. at
439-40. Waiver was defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Id. at 439, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). In contrast,
deliberate bypass occurs where some positive gain can be derived from forfeiting state remedial procedures, such as splitting claims in the hopes of being granted multiple hearings. See,
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cuse noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement" where application
to the state court would be futile and time consuming. 9
The effects of this expansion were magnified by the Supreme Court
decision in Kaufman v. United States" which increased the number of
situations in which Fay and Townsend could be applied. In Kaufman, the
Court indicated that state prisoners alleging fourth amendment violations
were entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.4 ' Although the fourth amendment had been extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,42 the question of
whether application of the exclusionary rule in a federal habeas corpus
e.g., Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972) (petitioner withheld claim for relief in state postconviction proceeding; deliberate bypass found on subsequent assertion of claim); Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (petitioner purposely withheld claim in federal habeas
corpus proceeding hoping to be granted two hearings). See generally Note, State Criminal
Procedureand Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HARv. L. REv. 422 (1966).
A state court finding of waiver based solely on the failure of the accused to appeal or to
object at the proper time would not be binding on the federal courts because such a waiver
is properly reviewable under Fay. 372 U.S. at 439. A deliberate bypass of state review,
however, may preclude later review of constitutional claims in the federal courts. 372 U.S. at
438. The presence or absence of a deliberate bypass must be determined largely on the facts
of each case. Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1107. In Fay, no deliberate bypass was found
since the defendant's failure to appeal could not be deemed a "merely tactical or strategic
litigation step, or in any way a deliberate circumvention of state procedures." 372 U.S. at
440.
, If state remedies are still available to the petitioner, the exhaustion rule requires that
the federal court must decline to entertain the habeas corpus petition unless state corrective
procedure is either unavailable or for some reason ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). The exhaustion doctrine requires that the states be given
an opportunity to correct constitutional defects before the federal court can provide habeas
relief by upsetting the state conviction. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755-56
(1975); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); see note 20 supra.
In Fay, the defendant had been convicted of felony murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Fearing that a new trial and possible subsequent conviction would result in
the imposition of the death sentence, the defendant failed to appeal. 372 U.S. at 394, 396.
His petition for habeas corpus was dismissed by the district court on the grounds that he had
failed to exhaust state remedies in accordance with the federal statute. 372 U.S. at 396. The
Fay Court found that the defendant's failure to make timely appeal in the state court, thereby
forfeiting his rights to state court review, did not prejudice his right to subsequent federal
court relief because the exhaustion requirement applied only to those state remedies still
available when the application for habeas corpus relief was filed. Id. at 399.
11 372 U.S. at 437. One requirement for the futility exception to apply is that the state
court must recently have ruled adversely to petitioner's position. Habeas Corpus, supra note
2, at 1099. Although the futility exception conflicts with the purposes of the exhaustion
doctrine, allowing petitioner to proceed directly to the federal courts in such a case eliminates
the wasteful use of judicial resources resulting from unsuccessful applications to state courts
and hastens the correction of state court errors. Id.
394 U.S. 217 (1969). .
Id. at 225. In dictum, the Kaufman Court mentioned three previous cases in which
state prisoners had obtained federal habeas relief based on their claims that they were convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. Id., citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
42 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Note, Fourth Amendment in the Balance - The
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 611 (1976).
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proceeding was constitutionally compelled was not clear.4 The Kaufman
Court indicated that the rule was applicable in all habeas corpus actions;"
the decision firmly established that all constitutional claims raised by
state prisoners were cognizable in federal post-conviction relief proceedings. 6 Combined with the new situations necessitating fact relitigation
after Fay and Townsend, the broad spectrum of claims cognizable after
Kaufman and Brown drastically altered the nature of habeas corpus relief.
From a simple device for testing jurisdiction, the Great Writ had become
a comprehensive tool
by which the federal courts could protect federal
4
constitutional rights. 1
The Supreme Court gradually began to reverse the expansionary trend48
10Because the sole reference to habeas corpus in the Constitution concerns only the
situations in which its availability can be properly suspended, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl.2,
and since the exclusionary rule was not literally required by the fourth amendment, see note
58 infra, the Kaufman Court's characterization of the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right was crucial to its decision. 394 U.S. at 226. Because the Stone Court later viewed
the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83
(1976), its application in federal habeas corpus proceedings was not mandatory. See id. For
an exhaustive argument that due process requires that the exclusionary rule be deemed a
personal constitutional right, see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. Rxv. 251 (1974).
11 Compare Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963) (exclusionary rule not
applied by state court; federal prisoner's claim of illegal and illegal search and seizure not
cognizable on habeas corpus) with Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(application of exclusionary rule for fourth amendment claims could be heard only in exceptional circumstances).
394 U.S. at 225-27.
Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1066.
McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L.
Rlv. 533, 546 (1976). The expansion of the writ was not acclaimed universally. Early attempts
to limit the writ were made during the 84th Congress, H.R. No. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955), and the 90th Congress, S.917, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 702(a) (1968). More recently, a
bill was introduced in the 93rd Congress to amend the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). S.567, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The purpose of S.567 was to amend
the federal habeas corpus statute to entertain writs of habeas corpus filed by prisoners in state
custody if 1) the prisoner was in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States;
2) the violation related to the reliability of the fact-finding process; and 3) the petitioner
demonstrated that a different result would probably have obtained if the constitutional
violation had not occurred. 119 CONG. R . 2221-22 (1973). For futher discussion of this and
other limiting proposals, see Bator, supra note 12, at 453; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Friendly]; Pollack, supra note 4, at 57; Wulf, supra note 23, at 254; Note, Proposed
Modificationof FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners- Retorm orRevocation?, 61 GEO.
L. J. 1221, 1222 (1973).
"5See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972);
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). But see Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
In Lefkowitz, the Supreme Court reconsidered the general rule that habeas corpus relief is
precluded by a valid guilty plea. See note 50 infra. The Lefkowitz Court held that when a
defendant pleads guilty pursuant to state law without waiving his right to state appellate
review of unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress, his right to habeas corpus review of the
trial court's ruling on these motions is not foreclosed. 420 U.S. at 293. See Note, Lefkowitz
v. Newsome: The Supeme Court Takes Another Look at Guilty Pleas, 33 WASH. & Lzz L.
Rlv. 223 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Guilty Pleas].
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because it appeared that the broadened scope for federal habeas corpus
relief placed an undue burden on the federal judicial system." Although
the restrictions placed on the writ first affected isolated procedural areas,5"
the Court's desire to limit the scope of substantive claims cognizable in
federal habeas corpus was exemplified in Stone v. Powell." In Stone, the
petitioner was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance, but was later
charged with murder and convicted on the basis of evidence seized in a
search pursuant to the vagrancy arrest.2 Alleging that the evidence should
have been excluded because the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional
and the subsequent arrest was illegal, the petitioner unsuccessfully presented his claim before the state appellate courts. Although the federal
district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit
accepted petitioner's contention and granted relief. 4 After considering the
proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court reversed. 5
The Court held that where the state had provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of the fourth amendment claim, s state prisoner could
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial.5
See note 60 infra.
E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). Tollett held that a valid guilty plea
made on advice of counsel precludes any inquiry into constitutional violations allegedly
occurring before the plea unless the inadequacy of counsel is proven. The Tollett decision
represents an exception to the rule that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea generally bars
later habeas corpus attack on proceedings occurring before the plea was made by allowing
habeas corpus attack where the inadequacy of counsel is proven. Guilty Pleas, supra note 48,
at 226-27. This rule had been developed in the "guilty plea trilogy" of Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
51428 U.S. 465 (1976). The possibility that the Court might take such affirmative action
to restrict the writ had been suggested previously by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973). Although Schneckloth involved the
validity of a consent search, Justice Powell considered the issue of the permissible scope of
federal collateral review of a state prisoner's fourth amendment claims to be more important.
Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring). He maintained that any federal inquiry should be confined
to the issue of whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise the constitutional challenge and to have the question adjudicated in the state courts. Id. at 266. Adopting
a threshhold requirement from Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 242, Justice
Powell suggested that the convicted defendant must raise a constitutional claim that casts
doubt upon his guilt in order to qualify for federal habeas corpus review. 412 U.S. at 258.
One commentator, concerned that increasing numbers of frivolous petitions could cause a
severe drain on judicial resources, advocated a similar position. See Friendly, supra note 47,
at 160 (prisoner must show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence including that
alleged to have been illegally admitted, the trier of fact would have entertained reasonable
doubt of his guilt).
12428 U.S. at 469-470.
" Id. at 470.
' Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 494. In addition, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that the history
of the writ did not support petitioner's contention that the exclusionary rule should be applied
"1
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In limiting the scope of habeas corpus relief, the Stone Court considered
the burden imposed on the federal judicial system in habeas corpus proceedings.57 Since application of the exclusionary rule,5" resulting in suppression of the evidence, was not literally required by the fourth amendment,55 the Court found that reconsideration of fourth amendment claims
on collateral review was not constitutionally compelled." In Stone, the
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 428 U.S. at 474-81. After noting that evidence seized
in violation of the fourteenth amendment was admissible prior to the decision in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), Justice Powell concluded that the principal justification
for the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp was the belief in the rule's
deterrent effect. 428 U.S. at 482, 484. Relying heavily on post-Mapp decisions which did not
require application of the rule, see note 58 infra, the Stone majority found that the application of the exclusionary rule was not a personal constitutional right. 428 U.S. at 486. By
characterizing the rule as a judicially created tool, id. at 482, its application was restricted
to those areas "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at
486-87, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
, See note 60 infra.
Implementation of the exclusionary rule enforces the fourth amendment proscription
against illegal search and seizure by prohibiting introduction at trial of evidence gained as a
result of a fourth amendment violation. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482. The primary
rationale supporting the rule is that police misconduct will be deterred when the rule is
applied to exclude evidence seized incident to illegal searches because the evidence usually
is needed to support a conviction. Id. at 486. This justification, however, did not compel
universal application of the rule, which had been partially limited prior to Stone. See, e.g.,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (fourth amendment does not preclude presentation of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceeding); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969) (evidence not excludable if obtained in violation of rights of someone other
than person trying to suppress evidence).
0 The Constitution provides only that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. Because no express mention of the exclusionary rule is
made, the Court has declined to apply the rule without considering whether application of
the rule is constitutionally required. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
0 428 U.S. at 481. Collateral review through a habeas corpus proceeding affords the
petitioner an opportunity to attack the integrity of the state court judgment in the federal
court system. Conventional justifications for allowing collateral review through habeas corpus
include: 1) the necessity that federal courts have the final word on questions of federal law;
2) the inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal claims; 3) the concern that
state judges may be unsympathetic to federal rights; and 4) the institutional limitations on
the exercise of the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969). The Stone Court, however, found that
resort to habeas corpus for purposes other than assuring that no innocent person suffers an
unconstitutional loss of liberty resulted in "serious intrusions" on important governmental
values. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. These values included the effective utilization of limited judicial
resources, the need for finality, see note 21 supra, considerations of federal-state comity, see
note 20 supra, and the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the federalism
doctrine is based, see note 19 supra. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). A typical fourth amendment claim raised
on habeas corpus was perceived by the Stone Court as having little bearing on the "basic
justice" of the prisoner's incarceration. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. Since the guilt or innocence of
the accused was not at issue, the Court found that such claims were generally inappropriate
for collateral review. Id.
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grant of relief where the claim had been adequately heard on prior state
review was not justified where the costs of applying the exclusionary rule
outweighed the utility of extending the rule on collateral review.' Because
the costs of applying the rule were particularly burdensome in a habeas
corpus proceeding, 2 relief was denied whenever the requirement of an
3
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim had been met.
The effectiveness of the Stone full and fair litigation standard depends
6,

Id. at 489.

The Stone Court found that the costs of the rule, in diverting attention from the guilt
or innocence of the accused and suppressing reliable evidence, were increased in a collateral
proceeding. 428 U.S. at 489-91. Although the Court found that application of the rule at trial
and on direct review was justified by its effect of deterring law enforcement officials from
violating the fourth amendment, id. at 492-93, the remoteness of the rule's efficacy on collateral review was perceived as having reached a point of diminishing returns, beyond which its
continued application was felt to be a "public nuisance." Id. at 493, quoting Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389 (1964).
1 428 U.S. at 494. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan interpreted the Court's
holding as a "substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction," id. at 503, and
accused the majority of attempting to judicially modify the federal habeas corpus statutes
in denigration of the congressional duty to confer federal habeas jurisdiction under Article
Ill of the United States Constitution. 428 U.S. at 506, 512. Justice Brennan actually feared
that the Court was laying a foundation for a similar withdrawal of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction in other areas. 428 U.S. at 517.
In reply to these accusations, the Court emphasized that the Stone decision did not affect
the federal court's jurisdiction over a fourth amendment claim. Id. at 494, 495 n.37. Rather,
the majority maintained that the decision limited the application of the exclusionary rule
only in cases where the full and fair litigation standard had been met. Id. The Court's
assertion that Stone did not affect the federal court's jurisdiction is questionable. Technically, federal courts still have jurisdiction over all fourth amendment claimants who can show
that they have been denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate their claims in the state
courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 426-27. Practically, however, the Stone decision limits
jurisdiction over all claimants who fail to make the preliminary showing of a denial of an
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate their claim because the court must refuse to exercise
its jurisdiction under Stone if the petitioner fails to make the preliminary showing. Previously, under Kaufman, Townsend, and Fay, the federal district courts had discretion to
conduct evidentiary hearings and to consider the claim on the merits. See note 23 supra.
While Stone arguably imposes only a technical limitation on the scope of the writ, the
decision actually limits the substantive scope of the writ as well.
Although a withdrawal of jurisdiction in non-fourth amendment areas would be a potential expansion of Stone, the question of such a withdrawal was not reached in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). Petitioner, a state prisoner, challenged the voluntariness of his
confession; however, federal habeas corpus relief was unavailable because of his failure to
object to admission of the confession in the trial court. Id. at 2500. The Sykes Court declined
to decide whether Stone extended to a "bare allegation" of a fifth amendment violation where
an opportunity for full and fair litigation was afforded in the state proceedings. Id. at 2506
n.11.
Prior to Sykes, other grounds of collateral attack had been foreclosed to state prisoners
in decisions which may have foreshadowed Stone. E.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 51213 (1976) (habeas corpus relief denied to state prisoner required to stand trial in prison clothes
because he failed to object to being tried in such clothing); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536, 542 (1976) (defendant's failure to challenge the composition of the grand jury which
indicted him was held to preclude habeas corpus relief where defendant could not show
"cause" for not objecting or "actual prejudice" from all white grand jury).
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on the federal courts' use of the standard to reduce the burden on the
federal judicial system. Because the Stone opinion provided little guidance
on the application of the "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard,
subsequent federal court interpretations of the standard have varied." The
Stone Court's failure to adequately define full and fair litigation has left
the federal courts with the responsibility of interpreting the standard.
After examining the state court proceedings, many lower federal courts
have denied habeas corpus relief without articulating the standard which
was applied.6
Although the Stone Court did not define the full and fair litigation
standard, it indicated that Townsend was relevant in determining when
full and fair litigation had been provided." The literal use of Townsend to
interpret the standard, however, may be improper. Townsend considered
the adequacy of state fact-finding hearings in determining whether a federal court in a habeas corpus action could reconsider the facts." In contrast, Stone considered whether granting habeas corpus review of the legal
issue was justified, regardless of the adequacy of the fact-finding process."
Given this difference, if the Stone Court's citation of Townsend was intended to indicate that full and fair litigation had been denied whenever
the Townsend criteria had not been satisfied, review of the legal issue
would be proper whenever the state fact-finding process is inadequate.
Therefore, Stone would have little effect on the scope of habeas corpus
relief because Stone would merely reiterate Townsend in a search and
seizure context. A more acceptable view is that the Stone Court intended
the citation of Townsend to establish criteria for federal courts to use in
" Compare Gates v. Henderson, No. 76-2065 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977) with O'Berry v.
Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977).
,1See, e.g., Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (petitioner
received pre-trial evidentiary hearing on fourth amendment claim, renewed claim during
trial, and claim was sole issue on direct appeal); Williams v. Ohio, 547 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam) (petitioner's claim considered in state trial court, state appellate court, and state
supreme court); Szarez v. Perini, 422 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (state court transcript
indicated beyond doubt that opportunity for full and fair litigation had been provided in the
state courts).
" 428 U.S. at 494 n.36.
See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
See 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Apart from the fact that Townsend applied specifically to the
adequacy of the state fact-finding hearings, 372 U.S. at 312-13, a fundamental difference
between Stone and Townsend may render Townsend's applicability to the full and fair standard less meaningful. While under Townsend the federal habeas court has wide discretion to
make its own findings of fact and always makes its own conclusions of law, the federal court
under Stone may be required to defer to state determinations of both. Boyte, FederalHabeas
Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only For The Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RiCH. L.
REv. 291, 318 n.115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Boyte]. Because the Stone Court may
therefore be more willing to accept state findings of fact, the determination of whether the
prisoner was afforded full and fair litigation becomes more complicated since the Stone Court
may not be as willing to probe the state iecord as the Townsend Court requires. Id. Conceivably, therefore, compliance with the full and fair litigation standard of Stone in state proceedings would not necessarily constitute full and fair litigation under Townsend.
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judging compliance with the full and fair standard. Under this view, both
Stone and Townsend may have independent significance. Where full and
fair litigation of the legal issue has been denied under Stone and habeas
corpus relief is granted, the Townsend criteria may still apply to the question of the adequacy of the state fact-finding process.
In Townsend, the Court held that a new evidentiary hearing was required whenever the state process had failed to fully and fairly develop the
factual issues. 9 Therefore, the Townsend criteria provide a definition of
adequacy for state fact-finding proceedings.79 Fullness and fairness under
Townsend can be equated with procedural due process, 7 with the
Townsend criteria describing the procedural due process requirements for
fact-finding hearings. Because the Townsend definition of fullness and
fairness is relevant to Stone, 7 the opportunity for full and fair litigation
would require habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim when73
ever procedural due process has been denied in the state system.
At least one federal court has found that Stone's requirement of an
opportunity for full and fair litigation requires that the Townsend criteria
be satisfied. In Gates v. Henderson,74 an examination of the state transcripts revealed that the state court had failed to develop evidence crucial
to the appellant's fourth amendment claim in accordance with
Townsend.78 Where the petitioner's fourth amendment claim was neither
6' Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1122.
70The "adequacy" of a state proceeding depends on the procedures and opportunities
available to the petitioner at trial and on direct review as well as the extent to which petitioner took advantage of those opportunities. Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1123 n.47.
" "Full" and "fair," when used by the Supreme Court, have been interpreted to require
a procedure which satisfies the constitutional minimums of procedural due process. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTTUToNAL LAW § 183, 202 n.48 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as FoMnoscH].
The following actions on the part of the state may constitute a denial of procedural due
process: 1) use of false or tainted evidence to gain conviction; 2) misrepresentation of the
evidence; 3) suppression of evidence favorable to the accused; 4) denial of adequate counsel;
5) obstruction of justice by allowing prejudicial publicity or mob domination. FoRKoscH,
supra at § 419, 460-61. In a criminal proceeding, procedural due process requires that the
conviction be supported by substantial evidence which has been carefully weighed and considered during the fact-finding process. See, e.g., Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.
v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. App. 1954).
72 428 U.S. at 494 n.36.
71Interpreting Stone to require reconsideration of a fourth amendment claim only when
procedural due process has been denied in the state system would be consistent with the
policies expressed in Stone against repetitive litigation. In a case where procedural due
process has been denied, the fourth amendment claim would not be considered in the state
court system. Thus, consideration of the claim in a habeas corpus proceeding would not
unjustifiably waste judicial resources where none had ever been expended in considering the
claim. The Stone proscription against needless litigation, see text accompanying notes 61-63
supra, would apply only where the claim had been fully explored at trial or on direct review
at the state level. In such a case, the opportunity for full and fair litigation would clearly have
been afforded.
1, Gates v. Henderson, No. 76-2065 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3453
(Jan. 17, 1978) (No. 77-5741).
" Gates v. Henderson, slip op. at 1360.
"' See note 25 supra.
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considered in the trial court nor on direct review,77 the Second Circuit
found dismissal of the petition inappropriate." Because satisfaction of the
Townsend requirement to fully develop evidence crucial to the claim was
a "critical precondition" to the application of Stone," the case was remanded for a hearing on the merits of appellant's fourth amendment
claim. Even though the Stone Court may not have intended every failure
to meet the Townsend criteria to constitute a denial of full and fair litigation," the Gates result is still consistent with Stone. Stone referred to the
necessity of providing the opportunity for full and fair litigation both at
trial and on direct review."1 The opinion, however, did not indicate that
the opportunity had to be provided both in the trial court and at the
appellate level. Stone thus requires that full and fair litigation at least be
afforded at one level of the state system." In Gates, petitioner's claim was
never considered on the merits in the state system. 3 Therefore, the grant
of relief was appropriate since consideration of the claim could not constitute needless litigation within the meaning of Stone.'
" In Gates, trial counsel failed to make a specific objection on fourth amendment
grounds so that the claim was not preserved for appellate review. People v. Gates, 24 N.Y.2d
666, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 597, 249 N.E.2d 450 (1969). Habeas corpus relief was denied by the federal
district court which found that the failure to make a specific objection in compliance with
state procedure constituted an adequate and independent basis for the state court's decision.
Gates v. Henderson, No. 73-3865 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976). Because the state opinion did not
specifically discuss their reasoning and expose their findings with regard to trial counsel's
objection, the federal appeals court found the dismissal of the petition inappropriate since
Stone did not affect the federal district court's obligation to insure that state findings and
reasoning are adequately set forth in the record. Gates v. Henderson, slip op. at 1356-57.
s Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1360.
See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
428 U.S. at 489, 490, 493, 494 n.37.

Id. at 469, 482, 494.

Gates v. Henderson, slip op. at 1355.
Although other cases have rejected the Townsend criteria for determining what constitutes full and fair litigation, the results of these cases appear to be consistent with the Stone
policy. In Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the petitioner had
presented his claim in the state trial court, but alleged denial of full and fair litigation because
facts material to his claim were not available in time for him to make the best use of them
at trial. Id. at 1223. Although the federal district court found that the state evidentiary
hearing had failed to adduce the material facts as required by Townsend, see note 25 supra,
the opportunity for full and fair litigation had been provided. Id. at 1224. The Pulver court
held that the opportunity to litigate was provided whenever the appellate process on direct
review was available to correct the errors of the trial court. Id. Therefore, in order to qualify
for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner would have to demonstrate that the state appellate
process was inadequate to correct the errors of the trial court. Id. Since the petitioner in
Pulver was unable to make such a showing, relief was denied. Id. Pulver,therefore, is consistent with Stone's proscription against unnecessary relitigation because the petitioner presented his claim before the appellate court, where the claim was rejpcted because it had
already received fair consideration in the trial court.
In Gates, however, the failure to develop evidence crucial to the appellant's fourth
amendment claim in accordance with Townsend resulted in a total deprivation of the opportunity to have the merits of the claim considered. Because the failure to comply with the
',
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Even where the Townsend requirements with respect to the adequacy
of the fact-finding process are met at the state level, the opportunity for
full and fair litigation has been held to require that the claim be considered
on the merits either at trial or on direct review. In Simmons v. Clemente,'
the state supreme court refused to hear testimony on the petitioner's fourth
amendment claim after holding that the state trial court's findings were
fairly supported by the record." Because no "serious procedural errors"
were found in the state supreme court's refusal to hold a hearing, the
Second Circuit denied habeas corpus relief8 7 holding that the state courts
had provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation where the petitioner's claim was decided on the merits in the trial court and no inadequacies were found in the state appellate procedures.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard,8" the court limited the review of petitioner's fourth amendment claim to a consideration
of the treatment the claim received in the state courts. 0 Although relief
was denied on the basis of Stone, the Conroy court indicated that where a
petitioner shows that adequate procedures for litigation of his claim are
unavailable or that the hearing judge is biased or is not following proper
procedures, the opportunity for full and fair litigation is lacking and habeas corpus relief would be appropriate.8 Allowing relief in the instances
enumerated in Conroy would be consistent with Stone, which implied that
the application of the exclusionary rule in a habeas corpus proceeding
might be justified only when the benefits of the rule's application outweighed the costs. Because the costs" normally associated with considering
a fourth amendment claim on collateral review in terms of using scarce
judicial resources would be incurred only once when the state court had
never adequately considered the claim, habeas corpus relief would be justiTownsend criteria did not have the same result in Pulver, both Gates and Pulver are distinguishable on their facts. According to both cases, a failure to meet the Townsend standard
constitutes a denial of the opportunity for full and litigation only when the failure under
Townsend prevents the claim from ever being heard on the merits.
552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
"
'T

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.

Id. The federal district court in United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F.
Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976), held that the denial of a hearing at the state trial court on the issue
of the veracity of affidavits submitted for search warrants constituted a lack of full and fair
litigation under Stone. Id. at 688-89. The defendant's claim that the affidavits were procured
by police perjury, rendering his arrest and search illegal, had never been litigated. Therefore,
the Petillo court found that defendant's claims fell "squarely within the remaining ambit of
the application of the exclusionary rule on collateral review." Id. at 689. In Petillo, the
"remaining ambit" for the application of the exclusionary rule comprehended a case where
the merits of the petitioner's fourth amendment claim were never considered in the state
judicial process. As for the Simmons court, full and fair litigation seemed to require that the
claim be considered on the merits by the state courts, either at trial or on direct review.
" 426 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 109.
12 See note 60 supra.
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fled. Where full and fair litigation has been interpreted to require a determination of the claim on the merits, a petitioner must show that his fourth
amendment claim was not adequately determined on the merits in the
state court system in order to qualify for federal habeas corpus relief.93 This
interpretation is desirable, both in terms of Stone and the goal of safeguarding individual federal rights. While avoiding the necessity of costly
relitigation, requiring consideration of the claim once on the merits assures
that constitutional rights will be adequately protected.
A showing of inadequate state procedure, however, may not always be
sufficient to require habeas corpus relief. Since Stone literally requires only
that the opportunity for full and fair litigation be provided, the standard
has been interpreted to preclude habeas corpus relief even where the applicant's claim was never decided on the merits in the state courts. In O'Berry
v. Wainwright,94 the Fifth Circuit held that where the state court was faced
with a fourth amendment claim but chose to resolve the claim on an
independent and adequate state ground," the Stone requirement of an
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate claims was satisfied so long as the
state ground did not interfere with federal rights. Emphasizing that Stone
required only an opportunity for full and fair litigation, the O'Berry court
found that petitioner's federal rights had not been denied since he had
sufficient opportunity to raise his federal claim in the trial court.9
Although O'Berry was decided on the adequate and independent state
ground basis, the court nevertheless interpreted the full and fair standard
in dictum. In cases where the facts underlying the fourth amendment
claim were disputed, the O'Berry court concluded that full and fair litigation requires consideration of the facts by the trial court and the availabil11Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Cases in which state
process was adequate include: Sandovol v. Aaron, 562 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1977) (petitioner
afforded evidentiary hearing in trial court, claim twice considered on direct review); Jordan
v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1977) (granting of writ reversed on appeal because the state
court findings were extensive enough that the federal district court relied on them in granting
writ); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976) (claim litigated at trial and on
collateral challenge to state supreme court); Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2633 (1977) (state supreme court completely reviewed claim);
Rigsbee v. Parkinson, 545 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (fourth amendment claim fully explored in
trial court); George v. Blackwell, 537 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1976) (claim considered at trial and
on direct review).
, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2981 (1977).
'5 In O'Berry, the defendant claimed that a warrantless search of his car was unconstitutional, but the claim was never raised at his trial or considered on its merits in any state
postconviction proceeding. 546 F.2d at 1210. Although the petitioner argued his claim fully
before the state appellate court, the claim was dismissed without a hearing due to his failure
to comply with Florida's contemporaneous objection rule at the trial court level. O'Berry v.
Wainwright, 300 So.2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Under the contemporaneous objection

rule, the petitioner's failure to bring his contentions before the trial court does not preserve
the objection for appellate review. Id., see note 33 supra.
" 546 F.2d at 1216-17.
,7 Id. at 1217.

Id. at 1218.
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ity of meaningful appellate review of both the facts and the legal issue."
Where the facts underlying the claim are undisputed, as in O'Berry, full
and fair consideration requires only that the state appellate court give full
consideration to the fourth amendment claim.' 0 Full and fair consideration therefore required that the defendant be given a full hearing on his
claim and the facts underlying the claim at least once at the state level if
such a hearing was requested.10'
By using the adequate and independent state ground as an additional
basis for denying relief under Stone, the O'Berry court ignored the implications of Fay. 2 Under Fay, petitioner's failure to comply with a procedural
rule would bar habeas corpus relief only if the petitioner had deliberately
bypassed state procedure." 3 The O'Berry court, however, found that the
procedural rule which limited state review served a legitimate state interest by conserving state judicial resources and therefore could justifiably
prevent petitioner from vindicating his federal rights.0 4 Although doubt
has recently been cast upon the continued validity of Fay, 0 5 the Fifth
Circuit's use of the adequate state ground doctrine to deny habeas corpus
relief where the claim was never considered on the merits is an unwarranted extension of Stone. If the O'Berry rule is followed, the question of
the fullness and fairness of the litigation under Stone will be avoided
whenever an adequate and independent state ground prevents the claim
from being heard on the merits.
Harmless error' 0 also has been used as an independent basis for deny" Id. at 1213.
10D

Id.

I0,Id.

"' See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra. See generally Recent Cases, Circuits Split
Over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunityfor Full and FairLitigation," 30 VND.
L. REV. 881 (1977). [hereinafter cited as Circuits Split].
'03 See note 37 supra. But see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In O'Berry, a
deliberate bypass could not be found. The defendant gained no tactical advantage by failing
to object to the evidence in the trial court. Even if he knowingly relinquished his right to
object in the trial court, federal habeas corpus review would still be permissible in the absence
of deliberate bypass. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
"1 546 F.2d at 1217-18. The O'Berry court applied Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965), to the facts of the case. Under Henry, a litigant's procedural defaults in state proceedings will prevent him from vindicating his federal rights so long as the procedural rule serves
a legitimate state interest. Id. at 448-49. The O'Berry court's reliance on Henry is misplaced
if Fay is still good law, because Fay makes the Henry rule inapplicable on habeas corpus
review. See Circuits Split, supra note 102, at 889.
"I See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (in absence of deliberate bypass,
defendant's failure to challenge composition of grand jury before trial precluded habeas
corpus relief where cause for failure to object and actual prejudice from all-white jury not
shown).
"' Harmless error has no effect on the result of a trial in which it is made. Note, Harmless
Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. REv. 814, 815 (1970). Where there is a
reasonable possibility that the alleged error might have contributed to the conviction, such
an error cannot be considered harmless. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
Before constitutional error is held harmless, however, the reviewing Court must declare that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26
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ing habeas corpus relief under Stone. In Cole v. Estelle,107 the Fifth Circuit
held that Stone precluded review of a state court finding that the admission of illegally seized evidence is harmless error."' 8 Because the petitioner
had received a proper opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim
in the state courts, habeas corpus relief was denied."' The use of harmless
error to deny relief in Cole is consistent with Stone. Unlike the situation
0
in O'Berry, 11
the merits of petitioner's claim in Cole had been considered
in the state system. Because the state appellate court had held the evidence inadmissible, petitioner was afforded a full hearing on the issue.
Where state procedure had provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation, the denial of federal habeas corpus relief was justified under Stone.
The Cole and O'Berry courts' emphasis on the opportunity to litigate
suggests an alternate interpretation of Stone in which the "opportunity to
litigate" may not be coextensive with "full and fair litigation." Under this
view, the fact that an opportunity to litigate existed would be sufficient
to comply with Stone even if the opportunity was never exercised. In neither Cole nor O'Berry, however, did the Fifth Circuit consider whether the
"opportunity" mentioned in Stone required mere presentation of the claim
or the opportunity to have the claim decided on the merits. Because the
O'Berry court found that the opportunity required by Stone had been
provided where the claim was never considered on the merits, the
"opportunity to litigate" for the Fifth Circuit may require only that the
claim be presented.' Because there has been no further support for the
contention that Stone requires only presentation of the claim in the state
courts, as opposed to determination on the merits, O'Berry may be viewed
as a unique case. If O'Berry is accepted, then the Fifth Circuit's emphasis
on the opportunity required by Stone may be properly considered only as
a semantic distinction.
The decisions in O'Berry and Cole illustrate the confusion that Stone's
full and fair litigation standard has generated. Under the interpretation of
(1967); see Vitello v. Gaughan, 544 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1969 (1977).
1- 548 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1977).
108Id. at 1165. In Cole, evidence which had been introduced at trial was held inadmissible
by the state appellate court. Petitioner's robbery conviction was affirmed on the grounds that
the admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cole v. State, 484
S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. Crim App. 1972); see Moore v. Cowan, No. 76-1859 (6th Cir. Aug. 26,
1977).
1" 548 F.2d at 1165.
110See note 95 supra.
Il Other courts have construed the "opportunity" to litigate requirement of Stone to
concern only the adequacy of the state adjudication process. Accordingly, the cases further
indicate that the correlative "full and fair" requirement is fulfilled when the merits of the
claim are heard at one level of the state system. Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977)
(opportunity did not require that petitioner's claim be decided on the merits on direct review); Denti v. Comm'r of Correctional Serv., 421 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (opportunity
did not require a new fact-finding hearing on direct review where merits of claim considered
by trial court). These views of what Stone does not require are concerned with the adequacy
of the state process. In these cases, the full and fair requirement is fulfilled when the merits
of the claim are heard at one level of the state system.
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the majority of the federal courts,"' the opportunity for full and fair litigation is satisfied whenever state procedure has been adequate to deal with
petitioner's fourth amendment claim.' Because adequacy will depend
largely on the facts of each case, the full and fair litigation standard does
little to clarify the law of federal habeas corpus with regard to fourth
amendment claims. While the Stone Court considered a situation where
the petitioner presented his claim twice in the state courts and had the
claim decided on the merits both times,"' the O'Berry court found that the
full and fair standard was satisfied where the petitioner's claim was presented in the state appellate court but never decided on the merits." 5
Although consideration of the claim on the merits at one level of the state
system would protect individual rights without unnecessarily wasting judicial resources, full and fair litigation may require a fourth amendment
claim to be decided on the merits both at trial and on direct review. The
requirements for full and fair litigation must be clarified before Stone's
effectiveness in limiting the scope of federal habeas corpus and reducing
the burden on the federal judiciary can be accurately appraised." '
See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
In Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-84 (1977), the United States Supreme Court
upheld a District of Columbia post-conviction review statute which limits the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the federal courts in a manner consistent with Stone. Modeled after the federal
habeas corpus remedy, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1970), the District of Columbia statute restricted
the scope of federal habeas corpus review of District of Columbia convictions. D.C. CODE §
23-110 (1973). This statute established a form of collateral review to be administered by the
District of Columbia Superior Court in the first instance, D.C. CODE § 23-110(a) (1973), and
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on review. D.C. ConE § 23-110(f) (1973). The
provision deprived the federal district court of habeas corpus jurisdiction unless the remedy
provided by the statute was "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of the detention.
D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1973). The Swain Court, however, declined to consider what a showing
of inadequacy or ineffectiveness would entail. 430 U.S. at 383 n.20. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the statute against a challenge that it unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas
corpus under art. I, § 9 cl.2, of the United States Constitution. Because the federal courts
could still hear a petition in those undefined situations where the statutory remedy was
"inadequate or ineffective" to consider the issues, the jurisdiction of the federal courts was
safeguarded. 430 U.S. at 381. The test of inadequacy or ineffectiveness established by the
District of Columbia statute would seem to be commensurate with the finding of inadequacy
necessary to show that the opportunity for full and fair litigation had been denied. See text
accompanying note 91 supra. Viewed in this light, the statute involved in Swain merely made
the adequacy of the new District of Columbia procedure the focal point for granting habeas
corpus relief. As such, the statute amounted to little more than a codification of the Stone
decision.
22 428 U.S. at 470-71; see text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
225 546 F.2d at 1207-08, 1213; see note 95 supra.
'"Recently, the number of habeas petitions has been declining, from 9,063 in 1970 to
2

"I

7,833 in 1976. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COuRTs

93-96 (1976). The total of all state and federal prisoner petitions constitutes only 15.2 per cent
of the federal district court's workload. Id. The extent to which Stone will further this decline
is speculative at present since a certain number of frivolous petitions can be expected in any
event. See note 23 supra. Nonetheless, the amount of judicial resources expended on each
individual petition should decrease. Because Stone requires a prima facie showing that the
opportunity for full and fair litigation has been denied, a brief examination of the state record

19781

STONE v. POWELL

In enunciating the full and fair standard, the Supreme Court may have
purposefully made the Stone decision vague. Disturbed by the burgeoning
workload of the federal district courts, the Supreme Court simply may
have been trying to return to the common law scope of the writ 7 by
denying habeas corpus relief where the "opportunity for full and fair litigation" has been satisfied. Because Stone's restriction on the scope of habeas
corpus relief was based on the diminishing value of the exclusionary rule
and the increasing costs of its application on collateral attack," the Stone
rationale cannot be extended logically to restrict habeas corpus claims
based on other constitutional rights.' The continuing erosion of the exclusionary rule cannot provide an adequate basis for the refusal to entertain
claims based on fifth amendment violations.' Therefore, by leaving the
limitation announced in Stone intentionally vague, the Court may be able
to adjust the scope of habeas corpus relief by clarifying the full and fair
standard and leaving the exclusionary rule rationale intact.
By effectively foreclosing federal remedies for state defendants where
full and fair litigation is provided, the Stone decision also may be an
invitation to the state courts to assume a more active role in protecting
individual rights.' 2' Chief Justice Burger has suggested that the state
courts develop more adequate post-conviction proceedings for their own
prisoners, believing that developments in that area will help relieve the
burden on the federal district courts and eliminate a major source of friction in federal-state relations.' = Although improving state remedies may
have desirable effects in reducing the federal habeas corpus workload,'2
will enable the court to summarily dismiss the petition in many cases without reaching the

merits of the claim and necessitating a burdensome evidentiary hearing.
"'

See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.

See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
n'See Boyte, supra note 68, at 298.
'"In order to extend Stone to cover fifth amendment violations, the Court would first
have the difficult task of characterizing the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), as a judicially created tool instead of a personal constitutional right. See
Boyte, supra note 68, at 318 n.116.
"

"I See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights,

90 HAv. L. REv. 489 (1977). Some state courts have construed state constitutional provisions
to guarantee more protection than their federal constitutional counterparts. See, e.g., State
v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent to custodial search must be tested by
waiver standard); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974) (suspect is entitled
to assistance of counsel at any pretrial lineup or photographic identification procedure); State
v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (right to trial by jury exists even for petty offenses).
in Burger, The State of the Judiciary - 1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970); see Hopkins,
FederalHabeas Corpus:Easing the Tension Between State and FederalCourts,44 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 660, 670-71 (1970).
12 Wright and Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of

Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 901 n.21 (1966); see ABA

ADvISORY COMMrrrEE

ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIEs

2 (Approved

Draft) 19-20 (1968); Note, CriminalProcedure- The North CarolinaPost-ConvictionHearing
Act: A ProceduralSnare, 55 N.C. L. REv. 653, 659 (1977); Note, State CriminalProcedure
and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HAv. L. Rev. 422, 428-38 (1966).
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the task of protecting federal constitutional rights should not be left to the
state courts in the absence of a definitive congressional or judicial policy.
Only through the establishment of a firm policy will the Court be able to
eliminate the confusion which has resulted from the full and fair litigation
requirement announced in Stone, and thereby clarify the appropriate
scope of federal habeas corpus relief.
LYNNE
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